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Index

0001 — Atlas project isolation

0002 — Append-only audit log

0003 — Narrow-scoped Mongo users

0004 — Cross-cluster Atlas PrivateLink

0005 — Delayed-job architecture

0006 — Mongo user simplification

0007 — Terraform owns ECS task def

0008 — E2E testing strategy

0009 — Self-hosted analytics + observability (superseded)

0010 — PostHog HIPAA Cloud (supersedes 0009)

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2026-04-23 — Phase 10 DNS cutover

2026-04-22 — Phase 8 prod AWS mirror

2026-04-22 — Phase 7 Atlas VPC peering

2026-04-22 — Phase 6 CloudFront + WAF

2026-04-21 — Phase 5 staging go-live

2026-04-17 — Atlas staging

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Member portal plan (ENG-187)

2026-04-16/17 handoff

2026-04-17 Atlas handoff

System briefing (2026-04-17)

Creative AdBundance proposal brief

Creative AdBundance analytics brief

ElevenLabs RN integration research

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Overview

On this page

HIPAA Safeguards Mapping ​

Evidence register for HIPAA Security Rule safeguards (45 CFR §164.308, §164.310, §164.312). Appended to every session that implements a relevant safeguard; never rewritten retroactively.

Scope today: staging-side technical safeguards. Prod rollout of the same controls is tracked separately and will land its own evidence rows once Issue #56's production exit criterion is satisfied.

Not yet applicable: physical safeguards (§164.310) — we don't run on self-managed hardware. The cloud provider (AWS) and Atlas BAAs cover the relevant physical controls.

§164.308 — Administrative safeguards ​

StandardImplementationEvidenceLast updated
§164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) — risk analysisAnnual risk register at risk-assessment.md; first version 2026-05-11 with 16 identified risks (Likelihood × Impact × mitigation × owner × follow-up). Next mandatory review 2027-05-11.Risk Assessment.2026-05-11
§164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) — risk managementMitigations per risk row tracked to closure; quarterly access review confirms in-flight mitigations are progressing; new risks identified mid-cycle trigger out-of-cycle review per risk-assessment.md.Risk Assessment review section; Access reviews.2026-05-11
§164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) — information system activity reviewAudit log review cadence: nightly automated drift check (staging-cluster-drift); quarterly access review of agent_audit_log patterns + Atlas database audit + CloudTrail anomalies.Access Control Policy; Atlas user provisioning runbook Step H; CloudTrail org-trail.2026-05-11
§164.308(a)(3) — workforce security (authorization + supervision)Onboard runbook enforces identity-domain provisioning + MFA enrollment before access; quarterly access review verifies continued appropriateness; offboard runbook enforces same-day revocation; future workforce members get a Workforce Confidentiality Agreement before any PHI access.Onboard runbook; Offboard runbook; Access Control Policy.2026-05-11
§164.308(a)(4) — information access management (least privilege)Five custom Mongo roles, each scoped to the minimum collection set for its purpose. Six users, each assigned exactly one role. AWS SSO permission sets (admin, power_user, billing_ro, security_audit) scope AWS access.ADR 0003, Atlas role JSON; Access Control Policy.2026-04-17
§164.308(a)(5) — security awareness + trainingOnboard runbook includes BAA Workforce Awareness brief (HIPAA = PHI handling rules; no PHI in chat/Claude/Slack/iMessage; secret-handling per CLAUDE.md Security rules). Quarterly access review verifies acknowledgment. Annual refresh required for all workforce members with PHI access.Onboard runbook — Day 1-7; CLAUDE.md Security rules.2026-05-11
§164.308(a)(6) — security incident proceduresFormal Incident Response Plan with roles (IC + Compliance Liaison + Comms Lead), severity classification (SEV-0/1/2/3), 5-step lifecycle, regulatory notification timelines (60-day HIPAA Breach Notification clock from discovery), and operational playbook in security-incident-response runbook. 5 worked-example incidents from 2026 documented.Incident Response Plan; Security Incident Response runbook.2026-05-11
§164.308(a)(7) — contingency plan (data backup, disaster recovery, emergency mode)Atlas continuous snapshots (7-day point-in-time + daily snapshots for 30 days on M10 tier); S3 versioning + lifecycle on stateful buckets; CloudTrail org-trail to log-archive with 7-year retention; Terraform-managed infrastructure (IaC) enables rebuild from source. Break-glass procedure documented for emergency mode. Full DR playbook to be appended as Phase 5 data load increases.Atlas backup config; Break-glass runbook; Encryption Policy backup encryption section.2026-05-11
§164.308(a)(8) — evaluation (periodic technical + non-technical assessment)Annual external pen test targeted Q4 2026 (RFQ July 2026); SOC 2 Type II audit at end of Year-1 evidence window (Q3 2027); quarterly access review serves as ongoing self-evaluation between formal audits.Penetration test reports README; Compliance Automation Vendor Evaluation; Access reviews.2026-05-11
§164.308(b) — business associate contracts (BAAs)Vendor register catalogs all subprocessors with BAA / DPA status; 5 of 11 BAAs signed today (AWS Orgs BAA 2026-04-18, Google Workspace 2026-05-01); Mongo Atlas BAA in flight; new vendor adoption gated on BAA-signed-before-data-flows.Vendor / Subprocessor Register; evidence files in docs/infrastructure/evidence/; #57.2026-05-11

§164.310 — Physical safeguards ​

Cloud-only infrastructure; physical safeguards inherited from cloud providers under their respective BAAs.

StandardImplementationEvidenceLast updated
§164.310(a)(1) — facility access controlsAWS data centers (FedRAMP Moderate); Atlas data centers (HIPAA tier). Inherited under AWS Organizations BAA and Atlas BAA.AWS BAA evidence; Atlas BAA pending PDF per #57.2026-05-11
§164.310(b) — workstation useFounder + ops laptops are the only workstations. CLAUDE.md Security rules govern workstation use (no PHI in chat / Claude / iMessage; secret-handling rules; HubSpot test-data conventions). Endpoint encryption (FileVault) required per Encryption Policy.CLAUDE.md Security rules; Encryption Policy.2026-05-11
§164.310(c) — workstation securityFileVault 2 enabled on all macOS workstations (verified at quarterly access review); MFA required to unlock; no workstation has standing access to production beyond what SSO grants in-session.Encryption Policy endpoint section; quarterly access review verification.2026-05-11
§164.310(d) — device + media controls (disposal + reuse)Cloud provider handles AWS + Atlas hardware disposal (NIST SP 800-88 in scope of FedRAMP Moderate ATO under AWS BAA). Workforce device disposal handled per Offboard runbook (wipe + return). No removable media in production use.Encryption Policy decommissioning section; Offboard runbook.2026-05-11

§164.312 — Technical safeguards ​

StandardImplementationEvidenceLast updated
§164.312(a)(1) — access control, unique user identificationEach service has a dedicated MongoDB user account (app_writer_survey, app_writer_plans, app_writer_agents, app_admin_agents, audit_reader, app_read_staging). No shared credentials across services. AWS SSO scopes human access; GitHub Actions OIDC scopes CI access.ADR 0003, Atlas user list; Access Control Policy.2026-04-17
§164.312(a)(2)(i) — emergency access procedureDocumented break-glass procedure for emergency-mode AWS access via account root credentials with hardware MFA; every break-glass session writes an audit log row and triggers a post-event review at the next quarterly access review.Break-Glass Root Login runbook.2026-05-11
§164.312(a)(2)(iv) — encryption + decryption (technical safeguard)All data at rest encrypted: Atlas AES-256 (HIPAA tier on prod cluster); S3 SSE-KMS with project CMKs; Secrets Manager SSE-KMS. Field-level CSFLE-with-AWS-KMS planned before PHI collections created (Phase 5).Encryption Policy; Risk R-007 — Florence AI encryption posture.2026-05-11
§164.312(b) — audit controlsagent_audit_log collection enforced append-only at the database permission layer. role_writer_agents and role_admin_agents have FIND+INSERT only — no UPDATE, no REMOVE. Readonly access via role_audit_reader. CloudTrail org-trail records every AWS API event with 7-year retention in log-archive S3. Atlas database audit logs at DB layer.ADR 0002, role JSON, verification probes passed; CloudTrail org-trail; Atlas audit.2026-04-17
§164.312(c) — integrity (mechanism to authenticate data has not been altered)Append-only audit log makes log tampering observable. S3 versioning on stateful buckets makes object tampering reversible. Git history on the docs + code repo provides tamper-evident provenance. Atlas write-concern + replica-set consensus protects database integrity.ADR 0002; S3 versioning configuration.2026-05-11
§164.312(d) — person or entity authenticationAWS SSO with MFA (TOTP today; hardware MFA planned per #67); Atlas org-level MFA enforcement; Google Workspace MFA; GitHub MFA; HubSpot MFA. Phase 5 agent portal will add NIST 800-63B AAL2 (magic link + TOTP per agent platform compliance).Access Control Policy; #67.2026-05-11
§164.312(e)(1) — transmission securityTLS 1.2+ floor enforced at every channel: public → CloudFront, CloudFront → ALB, ALB → ECS, ECS → Atlas (Atlas-enforced floor); SES + Secrets Manager + CloudTrail use AWS-internal endpoints with TLS. Cross-cluster Atlas reference reads use AWS PrivateLink (TLS at app layer + AWS-backbone-only at network layer — doubly protected).Encryption Policy transmission section; ADR 0004 cross-cluster PrivateLink.2026-05-11

§164.314 — Organizational requirements ​

StandardImplementationEvidenceLast updated
§164.314(a) — business associate contractsComprehensive vendor / subprocessor register catalogs every subprocessor with BAA / DPA / FedRAMP status; 5 of 11 vendor BAAs signed (AWS Orgs BAA 2026-04-18; Google Workspace 2026-05-01); Mongo Atlas BAA effective at M10 HIPAA tier (signed-PDF collection in flight per #57); new vendor adoption gated on BAA before any production data flows; quarterly review for status drift.Vendor / Subprocessor Register; evidence in docs/infrastructure/evidence/; #57.2026-05-11

§164.316 — Documentation requirements ​

StandardImplementationEvidenceLast updated
§164.316(a) — policy + procedure documentationComprehensive operating-control documentation in docs/security-compliance/ (this directory). Each policy is dated, owned, and reviewed annually. Each control mapping (this file + SOC 2 + EDE) is append-only with timestamped evidence rows.This directory tree; git history.2026-05-11
§164.316(b)(1)(ii) — retention of documentation (6-year minimum)Compliance documentation lives in version control (git); never deleted. Superseded versions retained as git history. Quarterly access-review documents stamped + archived in-tree.Git history of this directory; Data Retention Policy.2026-05-11
§164.316(b)(2) — availability of documentation to those responsibleDocs are in the team's primary docs site (VitePress build); accessible to all workforce members at any time. New members tour the docs at onboarding per the Onboard runbook.Docs site URL (docs/.vitepress/config.ts configures the site); onboarding runbook.2026-05-11

How to add a row ​

Each session that lands a HIPAA-relevant change MUST append a row here, including a link to the ADR / runbook / session log. Rows are additive and timestamped. If a safeguard is superseded, add a new row rather than editing the old one.

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